

Communism


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COMMUNISTS

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LABOR MOVEMENT



THE FACTS AND
COUNTERMEASURES

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON 6, D. C. **1947**

MAY 13 1957

DICTATORSHIP [of the proletariat] means nothing more nor less than power which directly rests on violence, which is not limited by any laws or restricted by any absolute rule. Dictatorship means—note this once and for all—unlimited power resting on violence and not on law—LENIN.

★ ★ ★

It is particularly important for the purpose of winning over the majority of the proletariat, to capture the trade unions . . .—COMINTERN.

★ ★ ★

THE CONQUEST of political power by the proletariat is a gigantic forward step for the proletariat as a class, and the Party must more than ever, and not merely in the old way but in a new way, educate and guide the trade unions, at the same time not forgetting that they are and will long remain an indispensable "school of Communism" and a preparatory school for training the proletarians to exercise their dictatorship. . . . We must be able to withstand all this, to agree to any sacrifice, and even—if need be—to resort to all sorts of stratagems, artifices, illegal methods, to evasions and subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on Communist work within them at all costs—LENIN.

★ ★ ★

IT IS INCONCEIVABLE that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states—ultimately one or the other must conquer—STALIN.

★ ★ ★

WE . . . stand steadfast and immovable against Communism and totalitarianism. . . . We resent the attempts of those who seek to utilize any branch of organized labor for the purpose of imposing upon our nation a form of foreign-conceived ideology—WILLIAM GREEN.

Chamber of Commerce of The
United States of America
Committee on Socialism and
Communism.

COMMUNISTS

WITHIN

THE LABOR MOVEMENT



A HANDBOOK ON THE FACTS AND COUNTERMEASURES

Report of
Committee on Socialism and Communism
Approved by the Board of Directors



CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF
THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

PREFACE

THE MASTERMINDS of Communist strategy, especially since the time of Lenin, have insisted that the labor movement must be moved steadily leftward, radicalized and infiltrated. Without a leftist labor movement the Communists stand small chance of gaining the objective of a revolutionary destruction of our way of life.

For this reason top management in American industry and commerce must concern itself with this problem. Sound industrial relations as practiced by the foreman, the division head, the industrial relations executive and top management may serve as a check to Communist infiltration. But this is not enough, as the following analysis reveals.

Furthermore, management alone cannot solve the problem. The cooperation of anti-Communist workmen and labor leaders is indispensable. The disclosures, along with the recommendations in this report, should be of help to those who are aware of the nature of the problem and who wish to do something about it.

Meantime, every effort must be made to set forth the facts of Communist infiltration and strategy in all fields—government, literary, entertainment, education and wherever the Communists are at work. Countermeasures in all these fields must be taken simultaneously so that each effort will reinforce the other.

For the person interested in these problems, we also commend the materials listed in the bibliography and the two earlier reports published by the National Chamber.

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THE FACTS AND COUNTERMEASURES

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INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM of Communism in labor relations can no longer safely be ignored. It affects vitally the employer, the worker, and the public. The fundamental reason for this lies in the nature of Communism. As noted in the earlier report, **COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES**, the American Communist Party is not a political movement in the normal sense of the term. Nor is it a reform movement comparable to the great surges in American history which have altered our destiny.

Communism fundamentally is a secret conspiratorial movement in the interests of a foreign power. Its policies are not American-made. They are made in Moscow and directed from Moscow. If the interests of the Soviet Union happen to coincide with American aims, as they did during the War, American Communists can become "superpatriots." When they diverge, as they have done since V-J Day, the Red groups seek to sabotage every phase of American life. Such sabotage is particularly dangerous and effective in the fields of labor relations.

If Communism were merely a domestic movement aiming at social reform, its tactics alone would make it dangerous. It is utterly ruthless in its bid for power. During the War, when all-out production was its motto, its drives for power in the labor movement seriously impeded the war effort. It promoted factionalism and dissension and thus undermined labor morale. Its secret plottings within unions led to a general spirit of distrust and dissatisfaction. Communists seem incapable of constructive efforts, even when they try to aid the union or management to increase production.

The immediate victim of their tactics is the employer with a Communist-controlled union. He is subject to constant political harassment, bad faith,

and every form of deception and chicanery. Even with the maximum of good will towards his workers, he will find himself unable to achieve peace and harmony. Production will suffer and costs will mount. As one commentator puts it: "Every time Molotov toughens up on Secretary Byrnes, the local union comrades play rough with the foremen and executives in plants around the country." *

Other employers suffer as well. Even where their unions are under honest, American leadership, they cannot insulate themselves from the trend. Sometimes they pay the price through strikes of suppliers. At other times, they find their own union leaders forced to parrot demands made by Communist unions.

Gains or even demands made in one sector of the A.F. of L. or the C.I.O. tend to repeat themselves elsewhere. It must be remembered that the labor movement is intensely political. If non-Communist leaders do not gain as much as their opponents, they may soon find themselves with an active Communist opposition in their own union. The opposition makes capital of the reasonable demands of the honest leadership. Hence irresponsibility in labor tends to become infectious.

An illustration of this analysis can be found in the policies of Walter Reuther. In the political struggles of labor, Reuther is considered a leader of the anti-Communist bloc. But at the same time, he is the head of a union which has a powerful Communist minority. He faces sabotage, not only from this clique, but also from the national headquarters of the C.I.O. Communist influences there have persuaded the top leadership that Reuther is a threat to their positions. As a result, Reuther faces an alternative: he must either be aggressive or retire in favor of some Communist dupe. This explains in part the conflict in his public statements. On the one hand, he may favor increased labor productivity and decry inflationary wage rises. On the other hand, he makes wage demands which cannot be other than inflationary.

* *Fortune*, November 1946, p. 285.

Labor Suffers from Communism

LABOR SUFFERS from this internecine struggle. Its legitimate objectives are obscured in factional struggles. It is maneuvered into expressive and fruitless strikes. Thus, most labor leaders concede today that the 1946 strikes brought no net gains to labor. Higher wages were offset by higher prices. A.F. of L. leaders have been extremely critical of the C.I.O. strike policy. They consider it political rather than economic. And one of the most important factors in labor's political struggles is the Communist issue.

There are many current indications that labor realizes how the Communist menace hurts its cause. Thus, in 1946 the heads of two C.I.O. unions resigned and gave as their reason Communist control of their groups. The National C.I.O. Convention in 1946 saw fit to denounce Communist interference. State Industrial Council (C.I.O.) meetings in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and New York took action against the Communists. There were rumblings in two other Communist-controlled unions. The first instance of restiveness was when Joseph Curran of the National Maritime Union engaged in an all-out struggle with the Communist officers associated with him. Then Lewis Merrill of the Office and Professional Workers, who has been a regular writer for the Communist weekly, *New Masses*, disclaimed Communist interference in his union, although his sincerity in doing so has been questioned.*

It is obvious that the public is a victim in these struggles. The shortages, inconveniences and sufferings of 1946 are too recent to need detailed re-counting. Yet, they may appear trivial compared to possible future events. If the foreign policies of the

* The resigning Presidents were Morris Muster, head of the United Furniture Workers (*The New York Times*, July 1, 1946, p. 1) and Frank R. McGrath, head of the United Shoe Workers (*New York World Telegram*, October 3, 1946, p. 2). For a summary of the Industrial Council moves, see *Business Week*, December 28, 1946, p. 64 and January 4, 1947, p. 56. In early 1947, Joseph Curran openly charged his fellow officials with putting Communist interests above union interests (*The New York Times*, January 5, 1947, Section 1, p. 7).

United States continue to diverge from those of the Soviet Union, we may be in for an era of thinly disguised political strikes. Strikes of this nature are basically sabotage. They will not be settled in any easy fashion.

The Present Situation

IN EARLY 1947, the problem of Communism exists in scattered Locals of A.F. of L. unions, and in a more serious way in international unions as well as Locals of the C.I.O. In the A.F. of L., pressure from the top combined with trained and conservative unionism on the part of the rank-and-file have tended to keep out Communist infiltration. Exceptions exist where there is a heavy concentration of Communists in a given region, such as New York or Los Angeles. In these sections, many A.F. of L. Locals and those of independent unions have been infiltrated seriously.

By contrast, the C.I.O. has shown great weakness in fighting Communist inroads. Furthermore, so many of the rank-and-file are new to unionism that aggressive pressure from the bottom has usually been lacking. Untrained unionists have often been quite helpless to ward off an invasion by a clever and unscrupulous clique of Communists in a Local. Their resentment at such tactics, however, rose to such a pitch in 1946 that the national leadership was forced to take some action against Red control. At this writing, trends are confused and uncertain, the more so since Communists are presently going underground and concealing their identities when this is possible.*

Master Strategy

SOME INDICATION of probable future patterns may be found in the general Communist plan for seizing power in labor, as outlined in

* For a highly competent discussion of this problem, consult the new series by Andrew Avery, *COMMUNIST POWER IN INDUSTRY* (*Chicago Journal of Commerce*, 15 cents).

Comintern schools. In Moscow plans, the primary emphasis is upon heavy and strategic industries, since control here is most useful for sabotage and revolution. Among these industries are railroads and communications, steel, and such war industries (or potential war industries) as the automobile, farm implement, electrical, shipbuilding, atomic energy, and related heavy industries. In addition, penetration is sought into government either through unions or through direct espionage. Finally, unions which deal with office and professional workers are penetrated by Communists, since they are used for commercial and industrial espionage.

It will be noted that this ideal pattern conforms with the existing plan of Communist penetration in the United States, with the exception of steel and railroads, where Communist success has been only sporadic to date. In these situations, however, current orders call for concentration of efforts to remedy past failures to obtain control over labor.

The value of knowledge by business leaders of the overall pattern is obvious. If they are in a field which is considered strategic, they can count on no respite from Communist attempts to control their labor unions. Vigilance can never be relaxed. It does not follow from this, however, that firms not within the strategic category are automatically assured of labor harmony. Control of strategic industries is not the only labor objective of Communists. They seek control of the labor movement as a whole; they use it as a source of members and a medium for propaganda; and they draw vast funds from captive unions. Accordingly, if any labor situation is ripe for exploitation, Communists will seize upon it. The only difference between strategic and non-strategic situations is that in the former case, the Communists will come back again and again, no matter how often they are defeated. In non-strategic unions, a resounding and thorough victory over the Red element may ensure peace for several years.

A Specialized Problem

IN DISCUSSING the problem of Communism in labor relations, it is basic that we note its specialized nature. Neither the average employer nor the average worker is equipped to handle it. Indeed, they often fail to recognize it at all. Many an industrialist feels that labor is inherently ungrateful and irresponsible whereas the real basis of his problem may be a Communist political machine which has enslaved his workers as well as himself. Also there are employers who, feeling that they know Communist tactics, attack honest union officials as Reds even though they are merely factual, calculating, and hard bargainers. It is a fact that labor leaders may be forced into an intransigent position because they are caught between two fires: the fight against the Communists within the union, and the bargaining with the employer to obtain minimum concessions. Intelligent recognition of these facts by employers would in itself lead to much more harmonious labor relations.

The problem may be stated in another manner. Today labor relations are not confined exclusively to problems arising in a given plant or firm. Local problems are important, but the sources of many of the difficult local questions are found elsewhere. Unless industrial relations directors have a trained realization of the roots of their problems, they may be very unrealistic and ineffective in handling this type of situation locally and in making recommendations to meet it. Mistrust and mutual recriminations replace genuine collective bargaining. Discussions of rates of pay or conditions of employment become academic, when a political machine is looking for excuses to cause trouble.*

Purely political strikes by Communist-controlled unions cannot as yet be called commonplace. However, before we entered the War, the North American Aircraft strike and the Allis-Chalmers strike were inspired by the then current Soviet policy of preventing aid to Hitler's enemies. More recently,

* See: *Communist Power in Industry*.

a brief shipping strike in 1945 was politically inspired. Although the possibility of having more political strikes cannot be discounted, they should be considered the exception rather than the rule at this time. What is much more common is the prolonging of an apparently economic strike for political reasons. Thus in the 1946 Allis-Chalmers strike a group of workers declared: "We have returned to work after being taken to the cleaners by a bunch of Communist revolutionaries."* This same sentiment was voiced by workers in two other strikes, in Connecticut and New Jersey. Unfortunately, such a realization often arises only after grave damage has been done. To repeat, the diagnosis of such problems requires expert and specialized knowledge.

Communist-Inspired Strikes

IN VIEW of probable future trends, special attention should be given to the problem of the Communist-inspired strikes. Strikes hurt. They are injurious not only to those involved, but also to the general public. The employer loses immediate earnings and the future good will both of his workers and his customers. To the worker, a strike means physical and mental suffering for an uncertain goal. Even if he attains his ends, he may be in such a weakened economic position that he may have to work for several years to make up for wages lost during the strike. The general public loses when production is interrupted and when purchases by the strikers decline. The larger the number involved in the strike, the greater is the public loss. At times public health and security may be placed in jeopardy, as was the case with the coal and power strikes. The unions themselves usually fear strikes. This fear is based on the heavy cost which has often been sufficient to wreck strong Locals. Even when a union feels that its cause is just, it still must decide whether a struggle would be worth its possible cost.

Even with basic good will, hard bargaining at

* *New York Times*, Nov. 25, 1946.

times leads to an impasse which may result in a short strike. But on the whole, labor leaders know that when management suffers, they suffer. Only in the rarest of cases will they risk bankrupting a company in order to attain an objective. Such is not the case with Communist-controlled unions. They are willing to fight employers piecemeal and to cause the maximum of confusion in the minds of the worker and the public alike. They seek turmoil for its own sake. They would gladly bankrupt an employer, thereby causing unemployment and building up bitterness and hate towards all employers and the American way of life. Hence it is vital that each employer possess an understanding of this problem before he is confronted with it.

One further illustration shows the implications of Communism in labor relations. There has been much recent discussion of labor-management committees. Much thought has been given to the question of management prerogatives and of labor participation in functions hitherto exclusively reserved to management. Many employers view with sympathy labor's objectives in seeking teamwork with management. They know that cooperation aids morale and stimulates production. But concessions of this type to a Communist-controlled union are most dangerous. If such committees are agreed upon, Communists are given a wedge which enables them to penetrate effectively into the field of management. This in turn permits them to increase the area of conflict and disruption. Unfortunately the fear of such a turn of events inhibits an employer in making such concessions even to a good Local. There are numerous examples of generous contracts made with fair-minded union leadership which later boomeranged when new faces and strange ideologies appeared at the bargaining table.

The Case of Local 94

INSTEAD OF dealing with the problem in the abstract, a case history may be offered. The plant in question was in a war industry, employing

forty thousand workers. Management from the beginning cooperated with labor and did nothing to hinder the formation of a union. Local 94 was connected with a C.I.O. union generally credited with being non-Communist. One of the national officers, however, was politically ambitious and connived with Communist groups in order to gain their political support.

At the beginning, Local 94 won recognition in a struggle with the A.F. of L. It became bargaining agent for twenty thousand workers. Its officers were fairly competent, and showed an appreciation of their responsibility. Bargaining and discussions were hard, straight, and constructive. Then the government expanded the contract and employment soon doubled. New faces appeared at the union hall, and many of them were actively interested in union matters.

Capitalizing upon the lack of experience of the Local's officers, a request by a few workers was usually sufficient to bring forth the scheduling of an official departmental meeting. What was the result? Suddenly a request would arise for another election, for a particular departmental shop steward. The incumbent's term might not have expired, but his pride in the job he had done would not permit him to stand upon this technicality. He wanted a vote of confidence. So he acceded to the demand and submitted to an election. The meeting was called, the election scheduled, the battle lines drawn. The incumbent did not realize that the meeting was packed with a roving group of employees from other departments. Suspicions could not be proved and election was by acclamation. Naturally, the incumbent was ousted—the Communist infiltration had begun.

The next move was a decision to print a weekly paper. This decision was made at a sparsely attended union meeting. Volunteer editors were immediately available, all of them Communist. From the very first edition, management was deprecated, belittled, and lied about. Malicious and personal attacks were made upon supervisory personnel. This gutter sheet plumbed the depths in its vitriolic

invective. And it had its effect in a new plant; this was a shop whose workers had little personal knowledge of any operations, other than those in their own immediate section. They had migrated from almost every State of the Union, and had no knowledge of the previous history of personal accomplishments by which to judge either management or their fellow workers. As a result, the vicious lies obtained credence, and bargaining became very strained.

At this juncture, the Communist faction proceeded to attack and undermine the existing union officers. This was done by prolonging union meetings until impossible hours. General membership meetings started at 8:00 p.m. and now might continue until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. These meetings began to be called more and more frequently and upon any pretext. This proved to be a terrific strain upon the health of the officers, all of whom worked in the plant. Their shift started at 6:00 a.m. and they could not afford to remain away from work. Moreover, they were concerned over the vicious rumors being circulated against them, and wished to show an example of industry and zeal. Like the shop stewards, they lost their heads and decided to call for an election as a show of confidence. This they did in the middle of their terms.

In the meantime, the Communists had built up a good political machine at the plant. By capturing shop steward jobs, they were able to process grievances and build a following. Their slanderous rumors against the officers were having their effect. At the same time, they were cultivating minority groups, particularly the Negroes and members of some national groups. Aiding in this process was the anti-Negro bias of a vice-president of the Local. As a result, the incumbents were thoroughly defeated, and a group of Communists along with their dupes were swept into power. In this Local, the Communists as such were satisfied to take over the posts of business agent and secretary. The president was a weak tool in their hands. Other posts went to ambitious leaders who could command votes. The power behind the throne was a shrewd, dis-

barred lawyer, who was a New York Communist who preferred "war work" to the Army. Later the State Communist chairman took direct personal command of strategy in union meetings by sending messages from a nearby restaurant.

The Results of Communist Control

UNDER Communist leadership, agitation was the order of the day. Turbulence and strife were deemed necessary to keep and to extend control of the Local. This policy of turmoil posed a difficult problem for the local leaders, when the Party Line called for all-out production. They solved their problem by giving up agitating throughout the entire plant and instead concentrated on irritating stoppages, "quickies," and slow-downs, all involving small numbers of workers strategically located. Numerically more significant were the noon-time protest meetings. Actually they were less vital, since the men were on their lunch period. Their presence did not impede production, nor did it even necessarily indicate interest of those present in the subject discussed. However, in this way, Communists hoped to continue agitation without interfering substantially with production, the USSR being under vigorous attack by the Nazis. In fact production dropped off twenty per cent. As a result, they gave up "demonstration tactics," and confined themselves to exploiting grievances. The slightest complaint would be magnified out of all proportion, and processed through all the steps of the grievance procedure. Reasonable, factual data meant nothing to them. Every grievance lost was automatically appealed to the higher steps in the procedure.

Within the Local a terrific all-out effort was made to eliminate this group of Communist disturbers. Charges were placed against individual members of the group and a trial was held which was unnecessarily extended over too long a period of time, at considerable financial loss to those making the charges. This was a period of turbulent charges and counter charges, and appeals to the Inter-

national. Here, however, a combination of weak leadership on the one hand and the influence of the pro-Communist International officer on the other hand, prevented decisive action. (Actually things became so bad that Communists came within a hair's breadth of taking over the International. Only after the War, and with the contraction of the industry, did the non-Communist leadership again become secure.) But within the Local, the bitter struggles tended to disgust decent members, who stayed away from union meetings and failed to vote in elections. Some of the dissidents went over to the A.F. of L. and tried unsuccessfully to change the affiliation of the Local. An adverse National Labor Relations Board decision on this matter was considered favorable to the Communist group.

During this whole struggle, attendance at Local meetings fell off. With a claimed local membership of nearly thirty thousand, it was not unusual to have less than a hundred persons present at general membership meetings. Usually a majority of these were Communists or their sympathizers. If they were uncertain of their majority, they would stage a disturbance and disrupt the meeting. Even when an active, but not too intelligent, anti-Communist faction formed, attendance rarely reached three hundred. Communist caucusing and knowledge of parliamentary maneuvers usually enabled them to outwit their opponents. As an incidental point, the fact that Communists and their dupes numbered less than a hundred at meetings shows the effectiveness of their tactics. A few dozen trained organizers were able to control absolutely the union policy of forty thousand workers.

The situation was cleared up only when the International stiffened its attitude and suspended the autonomy of this and several other Communist-controlled Locals. Trained administrators were sent to take over the Locals and what was left of the finances. In this particular instance they found that hundreds of thousands of dollars had been directly dissipated in Communist causes. This Local did not have a serious strike during the War, but not a cent was left of the million dollars collected in dues.

As a result of this episode, the workers suffered, the employer was plagued continuously, and the war effort was impeded. This is a typical, not an exceptional, Communist situation.

Reaction to Communist Dictatorship

THE CASE of Local 94 was described in detail, because it represents a pattern which is found elsewhere. Wherever the Communists either control a union or seek to control it, the same elements will be found: unrest, low morale, disturbed production, and, within the union, complete dictatorship. Employers find themselves in positions where nothing they do will satisfy the insatiable demands made by the leadership of the Local. They may find themselves embroiled in long and exhausting strikes. Such certainly was the case with Allis-Chalmers. Significant in this connection is a letter which this company sent to its workers on October 11, 1946. The firm presented to the employees photostatic evidence that the leaders of their local union had signed the nominating papers for a Communist candidate for Governor of the State of Wisconsin.

The result of the application of this "common pattern" is best demonstrated and expressed by the attitude of business men as described in *Modern Industry* (November 15, 1946). The tabulation of the survey shows that if managements who now deal with the C.I.O., where the problem of Communism is most severe, were allowed a choice, only 9.5 per cent would continue with the C.I.O., whereas 25 per cent of the group would prefer to deal with the A.F. of L. Of the employers who now deal with A.F. of L. unions, not a single one could be found to prefer the C.I.O. It is reasonable to infer that the strictly trade union practices of both groups do not differ greatly. After all, the C.I.O. began with unions which split off from the older group. The one point of major difference probably is the irresponsibility induced by the political activities of Communists, although some non-Communists in the C.I.O. talk in terms of class warfare.

How to Recognize the Problem

IN THE LIGHT of the preceding analysis, it is clear that the Communist problem is real in industrial relations. Yet it can still happen that an employer faces or will shortly face such a situation, and remain entirely unaware of his danger. He may know that his troubles have increased tremendously, but may blame the situation on general national conditions. Accordingly, it is vital that employers and their industrial relations executives become trained to recognize and to combat this problem.

Recognition on the general level demands some knowledge of both Communist literature and anti-Communist studies and publications. The most authentic Communist publications nationally are the *Daily Worker* and the *Worker* (Sunday), and *Political Affairs*. There are also a number of authentic local or regional Communist periodicals. In addition, an industrial relations director should consult the publications of Communist-controlled unions.

Useful studies by opponents are: *COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES* (Chamber of Commerce of the United States); *THE COMMUNIST FIFTH COLUMN* and *COMMUNIST POWER IN INDUSTRY* (Chicago Journal of Commerce); *THE COMMUNIST IN LABOR RELATIONS TODAY* (Research Institute of America); and the periodicals *Plain Talk* and the *New Leader*. (See bibliography.)

From these sources, an industrial relations director can obtain the general "line" and jargon of the Communist Party. He will learn which issues are considered important at the moment. Indeed, he may be able to obtain from *Political Affairs* a rather detailed blueprint of the collective bargaining demands which he is likely to meet when his contract expires. In addition, he learns which unions and persons are favored or opposed by the Party.

Naturally, a national edition of the Communist press cannot carry sufficient details of local activities. When possible, the national press should be

supplemented by reading local or union papers. Furthermore, the reading of the anti-Communist press will help sharpen an executive's perception of key Communist issues and personnel.*

With competent knowledge of the general Communist line and personalities, it becomes possible to judge the political complexion of a Local. The material included in the union paper, if one is published locally, is often a good guide to the type of control. Resolutions adopted in meetings and stands on public issues also furnish sound indications. Knowledge of the record and history of key local union personnel is also useful. If there has been any tendency towards ideological factionalism in a Local or an International, it is likely that officers will have taken sides with one group or another. Attitudes towards prominent union leaders engaged in such struggles also indicate an individual's cast of thought. Also Communists have their own distinctive jargon which can be recognized by a regular reader of their press. They label their opponents as "Fascist," "reactionary," "imperialist," and similar epithets fashionable in Communist circles.

Once the fact of political influence seems established, it is then important to discover the Communist leaders. It can be taken for granted that their numbers will be insignificantly small. But they will be surrounded by opportunists and dupes whom they are using to consolidate their power. As a rule, the opportunist is an able leader who will play Communist labor politics for personal gain, but who does not use their jargon or share their general political interests. The dupe ordinarily is a weak character with a superficial popularity. Preferably he is from a dominant racial or religious group. He does not use Communist jargon in his ordinary talk, but his speeches, if he makes any, are often written for him by the Communist leaders and may contain

* In this connection, attention should be called to two publications by groups connected with the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, the *Wage Earner* in Detroit and the *Labor Leader* in New York. These are mature labor papers in their own right, and show a keen perception of the Communist issue. For an analysis of the A.C.T.U. movement, see *Fortune*, November, 1946, p. 188.

words and phrases foreign to his normal expressions. Within the Local, Communists try to keep positions of real power (editor, organizational director, secretary, and business agent) for themselves. They may share some of these jobs with dupes, but prefer to give them positions which are merely honorary (such as president). Opportunists get the remaining jobs, and are permitted to share the shop steward positions with the Communists. In addition, there is likely to be a scattering of American-minded labor leaders who associate with the Communists because there is no other choice at the moment. If such leaders can form a strong group, they can often wean away the opportunists and attain to power.

The Communist at Work

EARLIER the case history of Local 94 was presented. It will be useful now to narrow the focus and see in detail how Communists seize power in a Local. In this connection, it is important to note that their methods are mainly political and only incidentally ideological. They use political machine tactics to gain power, knowing that once they are in control, they will have ample opportunity for ideological propaganda.

Labor unions offer a perfect arena for the use of all the arts in the game of politics. Their struggles are the most bitter, skillful, and cut-throat of any to be seen in this country. Civic politics reach their peak only at intervals; labor politics continue incessantly.

When the Communists decide to capture a Local, they send a small group of their members to seek employment in a plant represented by that Local. When employed, each of these becomes extremely active in union affairs with the hope that he can attract a following. At the same time, these militant agitators seek to cultivate ambitious union members who aspire to leadership. They build up the ego of these individuals and induce them to seek union office. To achieve such office, these opportunists are

encouraged to be active at union meetings. If necessary the Communists will supply them with ideas and issues. At the same time the Red caucus will urge each of the proteges to weld his personal following into a compact voting group.*

The next step is to unite these several proteges into a disciplined caucus. This group meets informally and prepares its program in advance for regular union meetings. The innocents are aided in picking issues, and their speeches are written for them if necessary. If they are timid in gaining the floor, an experienced Communist parliamentarian will gain it for them and turn it over to them. Communists will second the motions and make favorable speeches. The caucus and its followers will be scattered rather widely throughout the hall and upon signal will join in with loud applause and lusty shouting. In no time, the motion is railroaded through against disorganized and unprepared opposition. The fledgling caucus is flushed by its success and anxious for further action.

In these meetings, all the devices and tricks permitted by parliamentary procedure, and many that are not, are used to the fullest. When possible, motions are rushed through without debate. If serious opposition forms, the meeting is delayed or prolonged until opponents tire, give up the fight, leave the hall, and go home. From the beginning of the campaign, character assassination is practiced against the leaders of the opposition. Rumors are spread to undermine their influence with the general membership. Every effort is made to create trouble within the home. Anonymous letters and phone calls reach their wives, hinting that absences from home are not really on matters of union business. Communist women are prepared to seduce any opponent who is weak enough to fall for their wiles. Then blackmail effectively silences opposition from this quarter.

* For a detailed account of an actual case see: **COMMUNISM ACROSS THE COUNTER**, by Bernard Fielding, *Plain Talk*, January, 1947, p. 19.

Communist Seizure of Union Offices

WHILE union meetings are being taken over, a quiet campaign is being organized against those shop stewards and committeemen of key crafts or units, who refuse to accept advice and directions of the Communists. The plan is to take from them their union positions, thereby giving the Red group greater strategic power. This is usually done by seeking to prove that the official is ineffective in processing grievances. To do this, the Communist presents a complaint which has no solid foundation. He insists that it be carried through all the steps of the grievance procedure. When it fails, as it must, he is vocal in his criticism of the way it was handled. He joins with other workers who may have lost grievances, and hints that the steward is not a fighter, or that he sold out to the employer. Sooner or later, these tactics get on the nerves of the steward and he challenges the complainant to try to do better himself. The Communist is "invited" to go to the foreman with the steward to present his own case. But this time he has a fool-proof grievance which he has been saving for the occasion. He wins and thus builds up his prestige among the workers.

Often one such display is sufficient to unseat a shop steward. If he still holds on, the Communist insists upon being present for future grievance discussions. This is a trap which will help to oust the steward no matter how he answers. If he agrees, solid complaints are taken up and usually won. This means further prestige for the Communist. If the steward refuses to accede, he is given weak grievances which he loses. Immediately the rumors are renewed and intensified. The chances are that at the next departmental meeting, the Communist will take over as steward. If the plant is large and members do not know one another, Communists will pack the meeting just to be certain.

With the groundwork laid, concentration shifts to the annual election of local officers. Here the tactics are repeated. The opposition is goaded into

sponsoring some impossible demands, in order to outbid the Communists. They are often maneuvered into supporting poorly qualified candidates from minority groups, merely as an evidence of tolerance and sincerity. In the meantime, the Communists are spreading lying rumors about the officers. Simultaneously, they cultivate racial, religious, and national groups. Factions within the opposition are promoted, so that its vote will be scattered. Under these conditions, the compact, solid minority usually rides through without trouble.

Once consolidated into power, the Communists hang on by ruthless and dictatorial methods. If possible, the vocal and consistent opposition is expelled on trumped-up charges. Elections are fraudulent in the extreme. Many jobs are filled at union meetings which are closely controlled. Membership cards are often distributed to outsiders from other Communist controlled unions, so that they can vote in meetings and at elections. Ballot boxes are stolen or stuffed. As a result, the opposition often gives up and a Communist dictatorship is fastened upon the Local. The membership becomes apathetic, but it is constantly being exploited into hatred of the employer and disruptive tactics. Production and morale suffer, and costs mount.*

The Employer Takes Action

UNTIL RECENTLY, it has been widely held that the employer is helpless in such a situation.** Yet, granted that the Wagner Act forbids him to interfere with the organization of his employees, the employer is not completely powerless.

* HOW TO SPOT A COMMUNIST, by Karl Baarslag, *The American Legion Magazine*, January 1947, p. 9. WILL THE CIO SHAKE THE COMMUNIST LOOSE? Joseph and Stewart Alsop, *Saturday Evening Post*, February 22 and March 1, 1947. HOW TO SPOT A COMMUNIST, Leo Cherne, *Look*, March 4, 1947. These articles are especially useful to the anti-Communist employee and labor leader.

** Communists in the labor movement have been aided and abetted by the Communist influences within the National Labor Relations Board from time to time.

Such a feeling of pessimism is extreme. Present interpretations of the Wagner Act permit considerable freedom of speech by the employer.* Furthermore, although an employer may not intervene in union politics he can at least abstain from actions which aid the Communists.

This negative comfort is more substantial than it seems at first glance. In Communist situations it can be taken for granted that the workers themselves will form an opposition group. If the International is clean, it will normally be most anxious to remove a disruptive faction from its midst. Where the employer is wise enough not to interfere with such struggles, the anti-Communist group will often be successful. By contrast, it is not uncommon that industrial relations executives react in blind panic against all union demands by a Communist-controlled Local. This suits the Communists perfectly, since they can rally middle-of-the-roads against the employer and divert attention from the factional struggle against them. An anti-Communist union group cannot successfully argue the union's cause with the employers and fight the Communists within the union simultaneously.

As a first step in the counterattack, industrial relations directors should familiarize themselves with the Communist problem nationally and locally, as indicated earlier. Then it is important that such executives consult among themselves locally and within each industry where a Communist problem is indicated. The Communists themselves are organized along such lines, and it would be a mistake if the employers were divided and defeated singly. In such meetings, much can be learned of Communist tactics in making and administering union contracts. Naturally information gained from such sources must be used with caution until each individual has gained much experience. Many executives still do not distinguish hard-bargaining and sincere

* The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Dec. 5, 1946), held that the employer has the right to indicate his preference and opinion on labor union matters and even to endeavor to persuade his employees, provided such persuasion does not take the form of coercion. (NLRB v. KOPMAN WORACEK SHOE MFG. CO.)

union officials, or even trouble makers, from actual Communists. But experience will indicate which individuals at such a meeting, or which of his own company personnel, are best-informed and most competent in making such distinctions and in the handling of this problem.

At the beginning, at least, it may be desirable to call in outside consultants who are expert in handling Communism in the labor movement. Unfortunately thus far, none of the national services which are offered to industrial relations directors has concentrated upon this problem. Undoubtedly some individual industrial relations consultants are familiar with it. But the issue has been recognized too recently to permit the building up of specialized competent services in relation to it. At this writing, industrial relations executives must do considerable personal work to familiarize themselves with the background and current trends of Communism in labor unions.

Keeping Out a Communist Union

IF A PLANT is unorganized, the executive who understands how to handle the problem should use every legal means to keep out a Communist-controlled union. Under present rulings, it is permitted for an employer to give out this type of information to his workers. Such an action should be taken, however, only when Communist control is reasonably proved. False use of such charges as an anti-union device actually strengthens the Reds. Furthermore, it is likely to boomerang against the employer when subsequently he may be faced with the real thing.

In a situation of this type, the first step is to consult various listings to find the political connections of the petitioning International Union.* The next step is to document the charges made against

* For listings, consult *THE COMMUNIST IN LABOR RELATIONS TODAY* (Research Institute of America, 1946); *THE COMMUNIST FIFTH COLUMN* (Chicago Journal of Commerce, 1946); *COMMUNIST POWER IN INDUSTRY* (Chicago Journal of Commerce, 1947).

the union. Often considerable material about its officers can be found in the reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Records of the unions' conventions and material from the union paper may show a consistent following of the Communist line. It would be well to have such information prepared by, or at least checked by an expert, so no inaccuracies can creep in. As a further point, it must be remembered that to charge an individual with being a Communist or of harboring Communist sympathies constitutes libel *per se* in several jurisdictions. Evidence of Communist affiliation which is admissible in court and sufficient to prove such affiliation may be difficult to secure. The present "line" calls for Communist labor officials to go underground and not to admit their affiliations. Hence for individuals, the most that can normally be proved is that they are consorters with Communists and pro-Communists in their views. This, however, is sufficient to show the danger involved in their control of a Local.

The employer can then show the workers that Communism is un-American. He can do this either directly in his own publications or, preferably, by distributing literature prepared by outside groups. (See bibliography). He will also be able to prove that Communists do not seek to improve conditions, nor are their first thoughts the interests of the workers. The employees can be shown that they will be involved in politically directed strikes. Their union funds will be siphoned off to support various Communist front organizations. Their energies will be absorbed by constant bickering and factional disputes. Such internal union disputes are making almost daily headlines in the nation's press. Photostats of these articles or their headlines can be used quite effectively.*

If the employer publishes such statements, he must make it very clear that he is not using this as a form of threat or coercion, or to interfere in any way with the freedom of choice by his workers. The

* An outstanding illustration of an exposé was the series of sixty articles by John Sentinel in the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, Sept. 23-Nov. 21, 1946.

law guarantees to them complete freedom in making their own decisions in this matter. He is speaking for their interests in issuing this appeal. He will frankly admit that he does not like to deal with people whose loyalty is to a foreign power. But this is the workers' decision, and they must consider their own interests. (All of this shows the necessity of amending the Wagner Act so as to allow employers full freedom of speech.)

It is likely that if a plant is being organized for the first time, several rival unions will be competing for the votes of the workers. It is not at all improbable that such an appeal by the employer will be further documented and supported by all rivals of the Communist-controlled union. This will naturally strengthen the employer's case.

Working With a Communist Union

IF A Communist-controlled Local is already in a plant, the tactics indicated above should not be used. Under these conditions, any attack is viewed by the workers as an attempt to weaken their union. The result would be to solidify all factions against the employer.* The most that can be done in the way of passing out information is in the treatment of individual issues. Thus, an employer may explain at length the reasons for the position he has taken in collective bargaining. He should do this if he knows that a fair settlement of a problem is being impeded for political reasons. But in regard to the Communist issue in his Local, silence is normally the better rule. If the company paper normally discusses world and domestic events, relevant general material on the subject would be in order. Thus, it may be helpful to discuss Communist tyranny in Yugoslavia or Poland, or the harsh peace treaties which were imposed upon Italy and other nations at Soviet instigation. But the application of such material to local conditions

* An illustration of this point, in 1947, employer and newspaper attacks upon a proven Communist-controlled Local, weakened by a record-breaking strike, were not successful in persuading the majority of the workers to change affiliation to an independent union.

had best be left to the good judgment of the workers themselves. It might also be possible to mail anti-Communist literature, such as that listed in the bibliography, to the homes of potential leaders of an opposition.

Of course, if some outside group with no economic interest in the company is attacking Communism, this is a piece of good fortune for the employer.* Thus, for example, veterans and church groups have often been concerned with the problem. Activities of this sort cannot be construed as attacks upon unionism. This will be the more constructive if the employer does not attempt to intervene and direct the crusade to his own problem. Such intervention might be resented. He can be well satisfied if the general atmosphere is hostile to Communism. The workers can then take the matter into their own hands in dealing with their union.

Non-interference with union matters does not mean that an employer must be passive in the situation. His first duty is to obtain an informed insight into conditions in the Local. He should try to discover and classify the leaders in the Communist faction. Some of these he will consider as professed Communists, while others will be labeled as opportunists or dupes. He will then catalogue other union leaders in regard to their attitudes and effectiveness. Some may be neutral in the struggle between factions, interested only in a good Local. Others may be strongly anti-Communist and ready to fight the group in control. Still others may be opposed to Communism, but unwilling to fight, or unconvinced that the leadership is really controlled by Reds. Information of this type can be quite useful in the light of subsequent recommendations.

The Contract With a Red Local

IN NEGOTIATING a contract with a Communist-controlled Local, an employer must go in with his eyes open. He is dealing with persons

* E.g. *Exposing the Red Threat to Free Enterprise and Individual Liberty*, by Frederick Woltman, New York: World-Telegram, 1947.

who are not sincere. They will lie and distort what he says.* They will make impossible demands for the sake of stirring up trouble. They will encumber the contract with ambiguous trick phrases and booby-trap clauses to cause subsequent trouble. Hence the employer must be alert and prepared to meet unscrupulous opposition. But he is by no means helpless. Communists cannot ordinarily call a strike as a matter of whim. They must have some appearance of a case to present to the workers. And, if the employer does not let himself become panicked into rash statements or thoughtless action, the Communists may not succeed in causing trouble at this juncture of the proceedings.

As a matter of general attitude in such negotiations, the employer must avoid two extremes. First, he should beware of being extremely generous, in the hope of appeasing or buying off the opposition. Such tactics are fatal. The employer will not be thanked for his kindness. On the contrary, he will be confronted with new demands which he may find very hard to meet. In this connection it may be well to note the case of a firm which had an unauthorized strike called by a Communist faction. Not all the workers went out on strike. The company unwisely offered to pay wages to the strikers for time not worked, and triple wages to those who remained on the job. The result, as could be guessed, was a bitter attack on the firm by the Communist leaders with an unfair labor practice charge placed in the hands of the State labor relations board.

Secondly, equally dangerous for an employer, is the adoption of the fatalistic attitude that he will get a strike anyway, so he had better not make any concessions at all. Such an approach is a guarantee that he will get his strike, with all the workers solidly united behind the Communist leaders. The employer would be wiser to be prepared to accept the national pattern in economic clauses, if his competitive position will permit it. Naturally, as a matter of sound collective bargaining tactics, he will not make all his concessions in his first offer.

* If this is doubted, see instructions of Lenin and the Comintern on inside cover of this report.

If he is to grant benefits to the workers, he should be ready to ask for guarantees of production increases which will help to offset increased costs. His counter-demands will run largely in terms of security against wildcat strikes, "quickies," and other unauthorized stoppages of production. He can rightly demand no strikes for the duration of the agreement. Furthermore there should be definite penalties against individuals and against the union for violations of the agreement.

Another general point of value is the recording of all discussions, with the minutes of the meeting signed by both sides. Language of the contract should be clear and unequivocal, with a minimum leeway left for good faith or subsequent interpretation. It is well to have experienced talent available for the writing of terms. At the same time, the scope of legal advice should be clearly defined. It must not be forgotten that industrial relations directors have to carry out the contract on the working level. In drawing the contract, they should be given a position at least coordinate with, and preferably superior to, legal counsel. The legal mind is not always trained for the give and take of collective bargaining discussions. Legal talent is best employed for accuracy of phrasing of clauses drawn up by production and industrial relations executives.

Details of the Contract

THE MOST important details in a contract with a Communist-controlled union concern management and union security. Management should be extremely careful in granting any concessions which impede any of its prerogatives. Particular care should be exercised in drawing up the scope of the arbitration clause. Arbitration under a contract is frequently desirable. It provides impartial determination of disputes in regard to application and interpretation of a contract. If the contract is carefully and accurately drawn, arbitration will prevent the Communists from effectively

sabotaging it. Even if they engineer disputes, they will lose them when brought before an impartial party. Thus the onus for the trouble is shifted from the employer to the Local leaders. Yet it would be dangerous to entrust to an arbitrator functions which properly belong to management. Certainly a clause which permits arbitration of *any dispute* between the union and the company is extreme. Management's right to change the scope of its operations, to promote workers to executive positions, to transfer workers, to alter shifts, and the like, should in principle be non-arbitrable. Individual discharges, layoffs, upgrading within the unit of representation, and such may be arbitrable as to fact and within the scope of the contract.

With a Communist-controlled Local, it is a most dangerous principle to admit any action which involves a review of managerial decisions. As noted earlier, many employers favor some type of labor-management cooperation. With the Communists, however, these clauses would be used to enforce labor dictation to management in the latter's field. Communist Locals are often willing to sacrifice economic gains in order to drive a wedge into the field of management prerogatives and responsibilities.

Likewise an employer should be most careful in granting extreme forms of union security when his Local is Communist-dominated. The leaders would make almost any concession to gain a closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance of membership. Such a clause would be invaluable to them in exercising dictatorship over their members. Trumped-up expulsions would give them an opportunity for demanding the discharge of their opponents. If some form of security clause already exists or must be given, it is necessary to insist upon impartial review of all union expulsions, should discharges be involved. The best way is to give union members the same right to appeal discharge cases under union security clauses as they have in other discharge cases. The impartial chairman would have the right and duty to pass upon the adequacy of the trial given to the member in question.

Plant Discipline

THE CONTRACT with a Communist-controlled Local should be clear and strict in defining matters of plant discipline. Naturally Communists will try to do as much political work as possible during working hours and while on the job. Furthermore, they will be away from the plant frequently for political reasons. To prevent this, it is necessary to have a graduated series of penalties for unexcused absences. These can range from a light suspension for a first offense to discharge for a third offense within a reasonable period of time. Such rules are within management's prerogatives and need not be part of the contract. The contract should specify, however, the rights of shop stewards and committeemen to be off the job, with permission and only to settle grievances. The total amount of time permitted should be specified but flexible in its use, so that real grievances can be processed. However, such allowances should be definitely tied up to the settling of grievances, and not available as an excuse for political meddling. Normally shop stewards should be confined to their department, except when their presence is required to settle a grievance on a higher level. There is no objection to the company's paying, at least in part, for time used to settle grievances, providing such a privilege is not abused. The burden of payment should be on the company or the union. If it must be borne by the individual shop steward, the better men will not accept the position and it will fall to the ever-seeking Communists by default.

The company should be reasonable in granting leaves of absence to employees upon union request, but strict in confining them to union matters only. Such leaves are customary for full-time officers. Temporary leaves should be granted for attendance at union conventions and other large-scale meetings. Naturally such leaves are without pay. Full-time officers in mass production unions are not normally permitted to enter the plant and roam at will. They are given every reasonable facility to meet with industrial relations executives. But their contacts

with union members should be after working hours.

Contract clauses should be sought which will provide strict discipline for violations of the agreement. Individuals responsible for unauthorized stoppages or slow-downs should be subject to suspension for a first offense, and expulsion for a second. If an unauthorized strike which ties up the entire plant is sanctioned by the Local officers or connived in by them, the contract might be abrogated and subject to renegotiation.

Caution for the Future

ANY NEGOTIATIONS with a Communist-controlled group should be undertaken with an eye to the future. It is not the reasonableness of the proposition in itself which should be determining, but rather the possible use which the faction in control will make of it. Grants which may be perfectly reasonable in other circumstances may be dangerous under these conditions. Furthermore, in bargaining with such a group, the employer should make crystal-clear the tie-ins which surround a proposal or offer. If he concedes an economic point to avoid an overly strict union security clause, he may find the rejected clause reopened later in the negotiations. Or the Communists may engineer rank-and-file rejection of the entire contract. Their aim is to explore the entire field of labor-management relations and to obtain quickly the maximum employer concessions. These they accept only conditionally. They then use these grants as a foundation for further demands. Unless it is certain that a bargaining committee can and will deliver acceptance of the contract, the conditional nature of the concessions must be insisted upon again and again.

This picture of vicious collective bargaining, without mutual trust, is indeed somber. It would be tragic if such a spirit were to pervade all negotiations between unions and employers. Certainly the suggestions given here are not meant to apply where decent elements have secured control of a Local. But the question arises: what if their control is

insecure? Here the employer must prudently choose between two alternatives. On the one hand, if the decent elements can get a fair contract, with generous concessions, it will strengthen their hand in the factional struggle. On the other hand, if they lose control, such a contract might be badly abused. The employer has to judge probabilities and make a prudent decision. Possibly generous economic concessions, plus a strong stand on management prerogatives and against excessive union security would be the best general answer in most cases.

Concurrent with a fair but strict policy in negotiations should be constant efforts to build up good will among the workers. If the employer removes real causes of grievances, has well-trained supervisory personnel, and a reasonable attitude towards the workers, Communist propaganda against him will eventually boomerang. The union members will become dissatisfied with their leaders, and may ultimately revolt against them. They will realize that the employer is trying to do the right thing, and that their own leaders are hindering the process.

Working Under the Contract

ONCE A CONTRACT is signed with a union, there arises the problem of day-by-day application of this document to the problems in the plant. This is a new phase of contact with the union. Whatever troubles may have arisen during negotiations should, if possible, be a closed book. The signed agreement is the law which should govern labor-management relations during the life of the contract. In theory, at least, both sides should live up to the terms agreed upon, no matter how good or bad they consider them to be. In practice, a Communist-controlled Local is likely to bring up again and again points which it bargained away in negotiations. The employer must be prepared for this and ready to insist upon a scrupulous observance of the agreement. Here is where adequate and impartial arbitration within the contract may prove its worth.

The most important phase of the daily application of the contract is the machinery for handling grievances. The employer must expect grievances no matter how carefully he may strive to be fair to his workers. The sheer size of many modern plants makes some friction and misunderstanding inevitable. This fact should be explained to foremen and other supervisory officials. Their normal reaction is to regard complaints as reflections upon their own ability. Accordingly, they tend to fight complainants in a spirit of resentment. With careful training, however, they can be made to realize that top management expects a certain number of grievances as a routine feature of operations. It is only when the number of complaints is unusually large or small that a problem may exist.

Under normal grievance procedure, the settling of complaints tends to remove irritations and improve morale. Production is benefited by an efficient system for handling grievances. But when there are sharp deviations from average results in a given department, the industrial relations office faces a difficulty. If complaints are below average, this may indicate exceptional tact and ability on the part of the foreman. On the other hand, it may spring from poor work on the part of the union shop steward. Paradoxically, such a situation is not to an employer's advantage. If real grievances are not presented and quickly solved, morale suffers. A foreman who browbeats a timid shop steward is following a short-sighted policy. Also, a sub-normal amount of grievances can arise where a foreman is weak and yielding in applying established company policy. Such a situation means trouble, since concessions which deviate from the contract create annoying precedents which will be used by an alert Local. Uniform interpretation of the contract is essential for harmonious industrial relations.

Where grievances in a department tend consistently to exceed the average, a different set of problems arises. Such a situation could be caused by a foreman who is either excessively harsh or unduly fearful. The one tends to belittle grievances

and must be forced into acting upon them. The other is afraid to make mistakes and hence tries to pass all but the simplest problems to higher levels. Both these types are undesirable, the former because he damages morale and the latter because he tends to clog up the grievance machinery. On the other hand, the fault may lie with the union shop steward. He may be aggressive or quarrelsome by nature, or he may be following Communist tactics. Earlier we noted how Communists try to capitalize upon the grievance machinery to win a following. Here is a real test of the skill possessed by industrial relations executives.

Communists and the Grievance Procedure

WHERE an abnormal grievance situation exists, and the fault cannot properly be laid at the door of the foreman, a careful diagnosis will reveal how to catalogue the shop steward who is provoking trouble. The isolated rebel and the malcontent are usually easy to spot. Neither has close relationship with the Communist faction and they are generally independent in union politics. The Communists may try to use them in order to capture their following, but the relationship tends to be unstable at best. Even when they may work with Communists for a while, they do not follow Communist ideology nor do they espouse their political ends. Such individuals, while a problem, do not work in an organized and planned manner to bedevil the employer. Good foremanship and sound industrial relations normally tend to eliminate this type. The men soon realize that such troublemakers do their cause more harm than good.

The situation is altered where grievances are being manufactured for political and factional purposes. Even here normal grievance policy must prevail, but it must be applied with special intelligence and discretion. Normal policy may be defined as an eager willingness to settle at the

first step all reasonable grievances. Such a policy would discourage, through courteous explanation, carrying completely unreasonable complaints to higher steps. The good foreman seeks to develop such an understanding with the shop steward that each can completely trust the other's word and sound judgment. Under such conditions, a foreman may be willing frequently to stretch a point in favor of the shop steward, since he realizes that his good will is not likely to be abused. Where these conditions obtain, settlement at the lowest level is the normal result.

As has been said even with a Communist shop steward, the basic elements of normal procedure must still be retained. Just grievances should be settled expeditiously. The difficulty arises, however, through the lack of mutual trust between the shop steward and the foreman. The foreman under such circumstances cannot ordinarily trust either the word or the judgment of the steward. He may legitimately suspect ulterior designs and well-concealed traps. As a result, he is usually forced to perform as exhaustive an investigation as is permitted within the time limit set by the agreement. Where there is reasonable doubt, he normally refers grievances to higher levels, since any concession by one foreman will be used as a plant-wide precedent. For the same reason he cannot stretch a point or grant the benefit of the doubt to the shop steward. To preserve morale, he is on the alert for direct, on-the-spot settlements of problems with the individual worker, avoiding the grievance machinery where possible. He may find the workers themselves anxious to by-pass the normal processes, since they realize that their real complaints are thrown into the same hopper with manufactured political grievances. If identical policy is followed towards all employees and no discrimination tolerated, political grievances often can be left to die with the arbitrator and real problems settled directly. Formal complaints must, under ruling of the National Labor Relations Board, be handled in the presence of the union representative, but informal settlements can be made and in

most instances lead to smooth relationships even under a Communist shop steward.

Where a Communist is trying to win the post of shop steward, the foreman must avoid the trap described earlier. He should never permit the Communist as an individual to bring complaints to him, but should insist upon dealing with the legitimate shop steward. In dealing with the latter, he must be fair and even generous, as was described in connection with normal grievance policy. If the foreman knows that the steward is being badgered by a Communist into submitting poor grievances, he should cooperate with the steward by explaining, in the presence of the complaining employee if necessary, why the grievance cannot be settled in his favor. Such a careful explanation can serve to discredit the Communist and shift the burden of rejection from the shoulders of the decent and honest shop steward.

The effect of such a policy should be great. It should serve to educate the rank and file members on the basic elements of a fair labor policy. They will realize that the aggressive, belligerent tactics of the Communist do not produce lasting results. Rather they will note that such an approach tends mostly to slow down and interfere with legitimate bargaining. It will soon be evident to them that decent union stewards are producing better results because of their policy of honesty and mutual trust. The result will be a definite if gradual swing in favor of such competent and successful officials. Since grievances are to a union what patronage is to a political machine, it will not be long before the Communists are bereft of power.

The Industrial Relations Director

THE PROBLEM of applying the contract so as to minimize Communist difficulties provides real obstacles for the industrial relations executive. That he may do this well, top management must give him adequate authority to act and repose confidence in his judgment. If they cannot do this, he should be replaced.

The first step in the industrial relations department is to explain the contract thoroughly and carefully to the entire supervisory personnel. A good practice is to mimeograph a detailed explanation of each clause and to give the foremen a bound copy. Pertinent provisions of the Wagner Act and other applicable state and federal laws can be included in this volume. Meetings should be held to supplement written explanation by oral presentation, and to encourage the asking of questions. The general outlines of the Communist problem should also be presented in these meetings.

Foremen should be instructed to bring doubtful situations to the industrial relations department. They should regularly report on their personal relations with shop stewards. Any traces of factionalism or efforts at political activity within departments should be reported at once. This will give the industrial relations director a chance to review the situation and to give more detailed advice to the foreman in question. In this way, foremen will not become unconscious accessories to the Communists' plans to take over shop steward positions. Foremen should cooperate likewise with the existing non-Communist stewards and not permit outside interference from agitators. It must be remembered that the best place to choke off Communist-inspired grievances is at the first step.

If the shop steward of a department is a Communist, it is likely that the burden of his activity will be shifted to higher grievance steps. He will present so many nuisance grievances that refusals and appeals will be normal procedure. At the higher level, the industrial relations executive will be meeting with the union grievance committee or business agent. The executive's problem is to prevent the Communists from capitalizing upon the situation for political purposes. He knows that he must grant reasonable grievances at this step, or lose them at a higher step. But with care, he can see that Communists do not get too much credit for winning good cases. Thus, in most situations a grievance committee is not politically uniform. Some members at least will be non-Communist.

Their word and judgment can be trusted. If a case, on the surface, looks good to the industrial relations director, he can direct the conversation to a decent union official, asking for his comment or opinion. When the latter favors the granting of the grievance, the executive can answer "yes," thus disposing of the case. On the other hand, when Communist-inspired and unreasonable grievances come up, they should be given the burden of defending them. When the answer from management is "no," they bear the onus of the defeat. Such methods will cause Communist tactics to boomerang, and build up the prestige of the American-minded union officials.

The industrial relations director should expect personal insult and vituperation from Communists on grievance committees. Under such attacks, he should remain completely calm and retain absolute self-control. Anger clouds sound judgment, and leads to hasty and ill-considered decisions. If the executive keeps calm, even though he may appear to be affected, he will frequently find that the Communists have baited themselves into frenzied loss of control. He can then call the meeting sharply to order and bring them back to the business at hand. Such tactics will hurt their prestige and often goad them into compromising revelations.

The executive can keep control of meetings only if he has effective power to make decisions. He cannot be expected to produce results if he is nothing more than an "office boy" who must report above for every decision. On the other hand, he has nothing to gain by pretending to have absolute power. Difficult problems will require delay and consultation, and the wise executive will state the situation frankly.

At times it is possible to handle "hot" or "loaded" grievances at a still higher level, if the industrial relations director feels that the complaint is sound, but has been presented at the meeting with the grievance committee primarily for political purposes. Thus, he can defer a favorable decision until after the meeting when the atmosphere is less charged. This may be at the arbitration level, or

it may be in direct dealings with Local or International union officials. Such may be advisable even if the officials in question are Communists. The executive thus demonstrates his fairness, once he sees the facts, and at the same time prevents the grievance meeting from being used for political purposes. Furthermore, if management loses a fair share of arbitration cases, it is spared the necessity of constantly changing arbitrators. Arbitrators who predominantly rule for one side will be accused of bias, even though in fact they were completely objective and used sound judgment.

In all the situations outlined here, it must be noted that the grievances themselves must be decided upon their merits. It would be unjust, and tactically dangerous, to treat complaints on the basis of the politics of the official who presents them. But the manner in which they are handled can have deep political implications. The unwary executive will find himself maneuvered into giving support to a Communist faction. If he uses discrimination and intelligence, however, he will outwit the disruptive elements within the union.

Dealing with Union Officials

THE REFLECTIONS on contacts with shop stewards lead naturally to the broader subject of relations with union officials. In this regard, an employer faced with a Communist problem must avoid two mistakes above all. The first is the development of a general resentment against all union officials because of his sour experiences with the Communists. Such a reaction tends to strengthen the hands of the radical group, since the moderates are thrown in with them whether they like it or not. A much more sensible policy is to treat each official on his own merits. If his character and actions are such as to merit confidence and trust, he should be handled accordingly. The effect of such discrimination is to strengthen the hands of the anti-Communist faction. They do not want special favors from the employer; indeed, the open grant-

ing of such favors would boomerang into charges that they were "Company men." But at the same time they cannot carry on a two-front strategy, caught between the company and the Reds at the same time.

A second error to be avoided is the identifying of a *fair* union official with a *docile* union officer. The adjectives are by no means synonymous. Thus, some industrial relations executives complain when a non-Communist official proves to be an aggressive bargainer at the conference table. Some have even been quoted as saying that they would prefer to deal with a Communist rather than with such an officer. It is true that at times individual Communists may be more pleasant personalities than occasional opponents. Yet, it must be remembered that Communist control means an organized and continual assault upon employers' rights. Communists set up standards which at times their opponents must imitate through the sheer necessity of self-preservation within the union's political structure. Often the employer himself is at fault through the failure to grant opportune and face-saving concessions to opponents of the Communist faction. It is not unheard-of that employers will win small battles at the conference table, costing American-minded officials their union jobs, and then lose major wars when their radical successors give employers a taste of real demands.

Even under the Wagner Act, the employer often has real, if thoroughly unconscious, influence in naming of union officers. Small but gracious concessions, frequent consultations, and recognition can often build up the stature of a union official. Likewise, the thoughtless by-passing of the same man, the announcement of concessions through the plant bulletin board rather than through the union paper, and similar oversights can lower his prestige to an alarming degree. The NLRB does not allow direct intervention in union affairs. But if the employer is not free to pick the officers he likes, the least he can do is abstain from actions which hurt them. He does not need to

embarrass and punish the decent element just to prove that he is impartial.*

A word might be said about direct dealings with union officials in an informal manner. It is occasionally possible to sit down to dinner with an international officer, the local president or business agent. Such informal meetings can be productive of real candor. Both sides can talk freely without worrying about a reaction from those to whom they must report. Such conferences need not have the slightest element of the dishonest about them. In fact, if such should be even hinted, the employer should drop them at once, and this from a purely selfish point of view, as well as from an ethical consideration. An official who would betray the men who elected him would betray the executive who confided in him. The only reason for off-the-record meetings is that collective bargaining, like the fashioning of peace treaties, requires a certain public attitude that does not make compromise and adjustment easy. Privately, an executive may admit that a contract clause is too severe; publicly, he may feel compelled to defend it. The same might be true of the local president in regard to certain demands made by the union.

Where collective bargaining is not new, informal meetings as described are frequent enough to be commonplace. Thus, in a by no means hypothetical case, an international officer used to have dinner weekly with an industrial relations executive. They would go over outstanding problems and grievances. But each kept his freedom of action. The employer's representative was unable to grant certain concessions strongly desired by the union official. The latter in turn did not hesitate to call strikes when he felt that the issues warranted them. Consultation did not bring a millennium. But it did narrow sharply the area of conflict. Furthermore, in this particular case, it

* It is probable that the 80th Congress will modify the Wagner Act so that employers can work more effectively, and without fear of law violation, with American-minded employees in opposing Communists within the labor movement.

served to hinder effectively the workings of a highly skilled Communist faction operating in the plant under discussion. This union official was decent, but not docile. He worked hard and intelligently for his men, but he was experienced and reasonable enough to see the employer's problems as well. Such a man is far better, even from the employer's viewpoint, than a docile company tool who will soon be outmaneuvered and ousted by his own people or by the Communists.

A Summary

TO HANDLE Communism in labor relations, certain steps are essential. They may be briefly recapitulated here.

1) The employer must realize that this is a specialized and serious problem. He must be prepared to recognize with accuracy the Communist line and tactics. He must consult with others so as to facilitate the spotting of Communists in action.

2) If he has no union, he should use every legitimate step to keep a Communist-controlled group from taking over his plant.

3) Where he faces the problem of Communism within a local, he should recognize this fact in contract negotiations. If Communists are not already in power, inept handling of negotiations might bring them in. Should they be in power, the contract must be drawn with great exactness. As little as possible should be left to good will or the application of common sense. Management prerogative and arbitration provisions must be tight and clear.

4) The problem of Communism will affect grievance procedure. Ordinarily grievances should be handled in an atmosphere of generosity and trust. With Communists, such an attitude would be abused. Careful and exhaustive investigation to avoid fraud and trickery is called for.

5) When the employer is confronted with American-minded union officials, he should treat

them with friendliness and trust. They should not be compelled to fight both him and the Communists. Decent officials are not of necessity docile or pliant to every company wish.

The Worker Fights Communism

THUS FAR, the consideration has been exclusively in terms of the employer's interest in fighting Communism. It has been mentioned incidentally that workers too are in the struggle.

Actually such a presentation is so specialized as to be almost misleading. The real struggle against the Reds in labor must be carried out by the union members themselves. As a rule, the best the employer can do is to protect his own interests and try not to interfere with the decent element in the union. Such action by the employer is important, but it would not be very effective if the workers themselves were not vitally interested and active.

Workers who fight Communism are usually influenced by one or more of three motives: patriotism, religion or desire for sound unionism. Many realize that the Communist is essentially a foreign agent. Whether he realizes it or not, he takes orders from New York which are directed by Moscow through Paris. Non-Communists know that his power in labor will be used against the best interests of the country. Others may be impressed by the low-level ethics and the anti-religious nature of Communism. Whatever be their faith, they know that the totalitarian State does not leave the conscience free. In this regard, members of minority groups especially cultivated by the Communists often become their most aggressive opponents, this in order to save the good name of their group. Finally, most union members soon discover that a Communist cannot be a good union member. He will invariably seek to use the union in the interests of an outside political party. Furthermore, his disruptive factional tactics hurt the legitimate interests of labor.

The effectiveness of the opposition is not neces-

sarily proportional to the strength of motivation. To fight Communists in labor, interest is not enough. Interest must flame into zeal, and be tempered by intelligence and experience. Communist control of unions is achieved by political-machine tactics. It can be countered only by a better machine which organizes the majority against a skilled and unscrupulous minority. Accordingly, the best fighters against Reds in labor are experienced unionists. In this category would be included craftsmen, miners, and railroad workers with a long history of unionism. As their allies they may have some proletarian groups such as Socialists and Social Democrats, and non-Stalinist Communist groups. The last-named Communists may be as bad as their enemies, from whom they do not differ in ideology, but only in loyalty to the Soviet Union leadership. In practice, they are rarely numerous enough to take over a Local. Normally, they merely add experience and militancy to the anti-Communist faction. In union struggles, such experienced leaders contribute organizing ability and generalship, although their diverse ideologies may add confusion. Those who have patriotic or religious motivation, but lack experience, at first can offer only zeal and numbers, the while acquiring experience.

There has been no mention of the employer's part in promoting anti-Communist activity within the union itself. The reason is simple: he has no part. Much as he may be tempted to join in, he must remain on the sidelines. Intervention on his part would only damage the cause which he hopes will win. Nothing is more fatal for a union group than to be labeled "company tools." Of course the Communists will use such ammunition anyway, but the employer does not need to furnish them with it. Two temptations in particular must be avoided. The first is the providing of the anti-Communist faction with funds. They will need money badly. Literature must be paid for. Time will be lost from work. It will be a hard struggle, but the employer must not assist. Possibly the International may help, or some other Local which has won its struggle, or some patriotic or religious group. Outside

aid in a factional struggle is always dangerous, but sometimes necessary. But when it comes from the employer, it is fatal.

In the second place, the employer may not aid through the relaxation of plant discipline. He cannot openly countenance factional activity by anti-Communist groups during working time. Well-meaning individuals should be warned when an infraction is noticed. Repeated offenses must be punished by suspension or similar penalties. The employer can take for granted that the Communists will make complaints against such violations. If he fails to act on such charges, he will label the opposition as company-dominated and probably face Wagner Act charges. By taking the initiative himself in warning the opposing faction, he can avoid such trouble. He is then in a much better position rigidly to enforce similar rules against the Communist group.

Tactics in the Struggle

THE WORKER fights Communism primarily through building a better political machine than does the Red faction. As an illustration of such tactics, we may take the case of Local 23. Here a Communist group gained power largely through surprise at the previous election. However, they were not given time to consolidate their strength. Their opponent, a trained union leader, gathered around him a small faction of loyal union members. They met quietly in one another's houses, while holding the Communists in check from meeting to meeting, and worked out a slate for the next election. Each member canvassed throughout the entire plant and built up strength for a particular candidate, but no indication was given that these candidates were part of a unified slate. At the last minute, a merger was effected and the strength controlled by each member of the caucus was thrown to all the candidates in the group. The Communists were caught off guard and soundly defeated.

A situation such as the one just described will

not be repeated often. But it does teach certain lessons which have universal application. The first is that the issue of Communism was not raised in the whole election campaign. Of course, the problem of Communism versus sound unionism was the cement which bound together the initial caucus. But the men campaigned for support on the basis of union issues and the ability of candidates they had selected. This was not a negative approach; it was a positive program. They did not seek merely to *displace* Communists as such; they *replaced* them with candidates who were better timber for union officers. The result was that they won support from all sides.

Union elections do not precisely parallel civic elections. In the latter case, a sound attack upon the "ins" often brings a large protest vote to the polls. With labor, the attacking of officers as Communists is more likely to produce confusion and lethargy. The Communists themselves will not normally admit the charge. They will smear and discredit the opposition. The average worker becomes so puzzled that his reaction is: "A plague on both your houses." Of course if, in an exceptional case, it can be proved that most of the officers are really Communists, such an attack will be effective. But it is one thing to be certain of a fact, and another and different thing to be prepared to prove it in public controversy and to an untrained audience. Ordinarily Communist charges are best reserved for the inner caucus and for word-of-mouth reports spread through the plant by the anti-Communist opposition.

The best political opposition to a Communist group is a well-rounded, truly representative, and able group of prospective officers on an election slate. If each of these men has a sizable following, he will be able to add it to the common pool on election day. The campaign issues raised by such a group should be both positive and negative. Positively, they should advocate measures which will improve the well-being of the Local. These are usually constructive, common-sense ideas which are likely to prevail in collective bargaining. Negatively,

they should attack the Communist officers on *union* rather than political issues. They will have ample reasons to point to neglect of duty, misuse of funds,* wasting of time in union meetings discussing purely political problems, and related abuses. The Communist issue as such should not be raised by the group; rather as individuals they should circulate such information by word of mouth.

A union slate which is likely to defeat a Communist group of officers must be both competent and representative of the membership. The old axiom "You cannot beat somebody with nobody" is true in union politics. The fact that a member is strongly opposed to Communism is not in itself an indication that he will make a successful union officer. Among competent candidates, choices should be made with a view to balanced representation. Departmental, shift, racial, national, and religious factors are normally considered in picking a good slate. In principle, all major departments, all fully staffed shifts, and each sizable minority group should have a candidate on the ticket. This will prevent splinter slates which divide the anti-Communist opposition and permit the Communists to exercise the balance of power. Every reasonable compromise should be made in order to avoid the situation of too many candidates for a given office. Communists try to provoke such splits so that they can more easily defeat a divided opposition.

Once a pro-American group of officers is elected, they should contact similar groups in their union and also non-Communist Locals of other unions in their region. They can thus pool information on Communist personnel and tactics. From others they can receive advice on policies and programs. At times such friendly neighbors can assist in passing out literature, organizing demonstrations, and exposing local Communist concentrations.

* Many millions of dollars have been drained from Communist-controlled union treasuries for the support of their political mass meetings and front organizations.

Consolidation of Power

COMMUNISTS, once they have gained power, do not as a rule yield readily. When they are ousted from office, they scheme to promote factions, discredit the new officers, and try to return to power. Hence alertness upon the part of the decent new officers is vital. Being men of principle, they will not use the Communist tactics of trying to expel their opposition from the Local. On the other hand, in attempting to be fair, they should not lean over backwards and tolerate tactics which they would not countenance from others. Open disruption in union meetings, gross violations of plant discipline, and departmental strife should not be defended or condoned. Disruptive tactics should be met by expulsion after a fair trial. If the employer penalizes a Communist for flagrant violations of plant rules, the officers should not allow themselves to be pressured into defending the culprit.

The new officers will meet their greatest problems in handling grievance procedures and in running union meetings. In regard to grievances, the Communists will use the tactics noted earlier in the attempt to undermine shop stewards. They will also appeal hopeless cases in order to discredit the union grievance committee, the business agents, and the arbitration procedure. Against such tactics, the officers should present a united front. Shop stewards should reject obviously unsound and political complaints. The business agent and the grievance committee should stand by the shop stewards. If some of the stewards are Communist and do send poor grievances to the higher steps, the poor ones should in general be weeded out ruthlessly. Occasionally some which are obviously weak might be presented, with the results and the reasons for rejection written up in the Local paper. The common sense of the members will do the rest, and the whole proceeding will serve to discredit Communist leadership and tactics. But under no conditions should the Communists be allowed to clog up the grievance machinery. Nor should they be permitted direct access

to management to present complaints, unless they are entitled to do so because of a union office they hold.

Union meetings should be run with the same care and firmness. The officers should master parliamentary procedure and not tolerate disruptive or delaying tactics. Free and fair discussion of issues must be encouraged, but the officers should be alert to Communist attempts to prolong meetings or to inject extraneous problems. In this regard, it would be a fatal mistake to disband the caucus which originally won the election. The caucus can ensure attendance of meetings, enter into preliminary discussion of important points, and arrange disciplined voting to table Communist-inspired nuisance or political motions.

Building from the Bottom

THE PRECEDING SECTION envisioned conditions where a non-Communist group was able to capture power in a single attempt. Frequently, however, such immediate success is not to be had. The American-minded faction must work step by step to gain control. In general, their approach will be political, but minus the Communist unscrupulous and unethical aspects. The three main steps are: discrediting of the Communist officers; capturing of shop steward and committeemen positions; and control of union meetings.

To discredit Communist officers, it is not necessary to follow their method of a slanderous whispering campaign. In most cases, telling the truth about their activities is sufficiently damning and, of course, much harder to deny. Their main weakness will be neglect of the Local in the interest of Communist activities. The Party is so exacting in regard to its members that they are likely to spend a great deal of time in doing work ordered by it. The result is poor service at the Local office, neglect of grievances, at least when the Communists feel entrenched, and the cancellation of regular union meetings. As a smoke screen, the Communists will

try to organize strikes, stoppages, "quickies," and protest meetings, but this type of action soon loses its effectiveness and increases unrest among the members. In addition, close scrutiny of the Local's financial matters will often furnish much damaging material. The condition of the Local's treasury should be contrasted to that of a well-run non-Communist Local of the same union or within the same locality. Moreover, Communists will make many mistakes in running the union. They are not supermen. Finally, the easily proved charges of Communist affiliation should be circulated widely. If the affiliation is known, but cannot be established in a manner easily recognized by the general membership, such information should be aired only to those discriminating enough to weigh the evidence.

Shop stewards stand or fall in direct relation to their success in winning grievances. The normal Communist steward is not too successful, since he aims to create disruption rather than harmony. The result is that even sound complaints are often not adjusted, since the foreman has learned to distrust both the word and the judgment of such a steward. These failures can be capitalized upon by an alert union member in the department. He may insinuate that better results could be obtained if the workers handled their own grievances directly with the foreman. Or they may be able to get a non-Communist in the grievance committee to handle them upon appeal. Or, finally, the non-Communist in the department may be able to goad the shop steward into letting him take up cases with the foreman. He should have witnesses for any such permission, however, lest he be charged with violating the union constitution or by-laws by dealing directly with management in such matters.

Control of union meetings usually involves a caucus to prepare issues and the bringing of sufficient members to meetings. The caucus should be well versed in parliamentary law and the various tactics used by the Communists to run meetings. Such a caucus prepares issues in detail before meetings, outlining who is to make and who is to second motions, give speeches, and call for the vote.

Above all, this caucus must be ready to handle delaying tactics, so that meetings will not be prolonged unduly. They must appoint alert floor leaders who are prepared to meet emergency situations and who will be followed intelligently by other members of the group. Techniques of this sort can scarcely be learned from books, although excellent literature is available.* The best method is to obtain the guidance of a trained non-Communist union leader. Labor schools are available in many communities where such fundamentals can be learned.

Special Difficulties

THE DIFFICULTIES of the struggle against Communist control vary with localities and the size of the plant. The problem is most severe where the plant is large and its workers diverse in regard to race, religion, and national origin. Under such conditions, workers do not often have personal knowledge of their officers, and factions are easily formed. In smaller plants, with a uniform working force, personal contacts are more frequent and Communist infiltration correspondingly more difficult. The mechanical skill and general intelligence of workers also enter into the situation. This is particularly true in the matter of organizing a caucus for union meetings. On the other hand, intelligent workers are often unwilling to enter into the bitter struggle involved in ousting a Communist group. Partly for this reason, Communism is strongly

* A brief study of parliamentary law has been prepared by A. Claessens for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. (*The A.B.C. of Parliamentary Law*, I.L.G.W.U., 3 West 16th St., New York City.) The same union publishes a *Handbook of Trade Union Methods*. (Each 25¢.) The United Automobile Workers (411 West Milwaukee, Detroit, Mich.) has a pamphlet on shop steward duties. No complete list of union pamphlets exists today, but the Labor Education Service, Division of Labor Standards, U. S. Dept. of Labor, is understood to be preparing such a list. In addition, it is publishing its own literature in the field. *Democracy in Trade Unions: A Survey with a Program of Action*, and supplement published by the American Civil Liberties Union, 170 Fifth Ave., New York 10.

entrenched in the United Electrical Workers, the United Public Workers of America, and in the New York and Los Angeles Locals of the American Newspaper Guild. This situation is due more to a lack of interest than a lack of ability to oust bad leadership.*

Another special difficulty in ousting Communists arises from their control of the election machinery. It can be taken for granted that they will conduct a dishonest election to maintain their power. If the national union is controlled by non-Communists, it is frequently possible for members to appeal to it so that the election may be supervised. In other situations, the election committee is picked by the membership. If the opposition to Communists is well organized, it is often able to control this committee. On the other hand, it is possible that Communists control both the national union and the Local. In such a case, the only remedy presently available in most cases is secession of a large group and the petition for the National Labor Relations Board election for new representation. Such a drastic remedy is often unsatisfactory, however, and a better solution, some urge, would be outside supervision of elections.

CONCLUSION

The Communist-controlled union is basically different from any other labor union. The handling of it requires fundamentally distinct attitudes and techniques.

In dealing with such groups the following underlying points must be remembered:

I. That such a union is primarily a bridgehead of a foreign power, Soviet Union leaders. When a

*To illustrate this point, a newspaper reporter quotes one of the best-known writers for the *Philadelphia Record* to the effect that indifference on the part of the high-salaried reporters was largely responsible for the Guild action which put three newspapers out of business in 1947. They rarely attended union meetings. "If there is any moral in this, it is to keep an eye on the Guild to see that there is always a healthy opposition to any steam roller." *Washington Post*, February 3, 1947, p. 6.

conflict arises between Soviet aims and American ideals, the Communist union will support the former and criticize American foreign and domestic policies. A union of this type is a pliable instrument, when needed, for military espionage and sabotage. It will fit into the general Communist propaganda machine, which aims to further the Soviet Union and deride the United States. If a military conflict were to arise, it will be a fifth column, attacking its own people from within. This is why, as was noted earlier, Communist labor leaders concentrate first on strategic industries and occupations.

II. The labor movement under Communism is an instrument for dislocating our economic and social structure. Communists do not seek genuine betterment of conditions. Rather they thrive upon strife for its own sake. They would rather have strikes than peaceful and generous settlement of industrial disputes. They would prefer agitation to the removal of grievances or social ills which afford the excuse for agitation. Reasonable appeals or sensible compromises mean nothing to them. They seek a war to the finish with the business community and our way of life.

III. The labor movement is to Communists a broad foundation for all their other activities, whether propaganda and "education," agitation among minority groups, or infiltration of government. From the labor movement, they hope to gain militant members. Its treasuries are drained of funds for various Party-controlled organizations and programs. This is the mass which is to be guided and deceived into ultimate revolution and immediate disruption of the present economic system.

In the light of these facts the employer cannot be complacent about the problem of Communism in labor. It would be fatal short-sightedness if he were so preoccupied with immediate problems that he overlooked the master strategy and the underlying motivation. And it would be quite unfortunate if he were to feel that normal techniques and usual procedures in industrial relations would be adequate to meet problems of this nature.

The analysis given here leads to one primary conclusion, that the ousting of Communists from labor unions is a highly complex problem. It is mainly a task for the workers themselves. With them, good will is essential but not enough. Skill, experience, and intelligence are required to perfect the organization needed to beat a Communist political machine. In this struggle, the employer can help substantially, even though indirectly. If he is alert to Communist tactics, vigilant in avoiding their traps, and careful not to give them help, he will encourage the decent element in the union to remove subversive leaders. The fact that his aid is indirect and often of the negative type does not make it the less important or essential. On the contrary, an intelligent application of the principles outlined here would contribute tremendously to the task. But, if the employer is not awake, the burden of the non-Communist opposition is increased manyfold.

The difficulties to be found and overcome should not be exaggerated. *The underlying realities of the situation all favor the non-Communist opposition.* The majority of the workers oppose Communism and wish honest union leadership. The Communists can usually be relied upon to be their own best enemies, through their neglect of duty and intense interest in outside matters. A well-informed employer can do much, without interfering with union activities or otherwise running afoul of the Wagner Act. General public sentiment today runs against Communists, their goals, and their methods. Accordingly, patience, skill and diligence will produce results which should be most gratifying.

From the larger point of view, the cleansing of the labor movement of Communism will have important results for the entire country. It will lead to sounder, more peaceful, and more reasonable labor-management relations. Furthermore, it will hurt the Communists badly in their fifth-column work for the Soviet Union. Of their four main types of activity—labor, minority groups, government, and propaganda—labor is considered basic. The removal of this support will cripple their work in other

fields, especially if direct attacks along all these lines are made simultaneously. Countermeasures are apt to be ineffective unless such simultaneous efforts are made on all fronts.

Communism and Communists have nothing to offer to the American people. Machiavelli pointed out four hundred years ago that, in the beginning, a disease is hard to diagnose and easy to cure; but if neglected it becomes easy to diagnose and hard to cure. It is in this spirit that the Chamber of Commerce submits this report to the American people.

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* To be obtained from a bookstore or directly from the publisher.

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* For additional reading matter, consult the extended bibliography in this document.

COMMITTEE ON SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM, 1946-1947

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS, *Chairman*,
Chairman, Securities Acceptance Corp.,
Omaha, Nebraska

THOMAS C. BOUSHALL, *President*,
Bank of Virginia,
Richmond 16, Virginia

FRED L. CONKLIN, *President*,
Provident Life Insurance Company,
Bismarck, North Dakota

CARLYLE FRASER, *President*,
Genuine Parts Company,
Atlanta, Georgia

RICHARD K. LANE, *President*,
Public Service Company of Oklahoma,
Tulsa, Oklahoma

EMERSON P. SCHMIDT, *Secretary*,
Director, Economic Research Department,
Chamber of Commerce of the USA,
Washington 6, D. C.

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